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Abstract 
The use of roles in Identity Management has proven to be a solution for reorganising and securing 
the access structures of organisations. One critical challenge companies face after they 
implemented roles is the maintenance of the role system itself. This includes sophisticated duties 
like periodically verifying the valid roles. We argue that due to the high complexity, periodic role-
checks need to be automated. However, as a result of lacking theoretical foundation, no 
approaches to leverage the level automation have been published so far. In this work we develop a 
catalogue of use cases that affect the role definitions within an organisation. We propose 
checkROLE, a tool for automated role-checking on basis of the defined use case catalogue.  
 
 
1. Motivation 
 
In today’s business environment companies provide access to resources to a greater number of 
users, and more types of users, than ever before. Major IT security problems arise because of 
employees gaining unauthorised access to resources as a result of manually handling user accounts 
([4], [12]). This situation results in the so called identity chaos. National and international 
regulations like Basel II [1], the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [19], and the EU Directive 95/46 [5] force 
businesses to audit the actions within their systems. In-house Identity Management (IdM) is a 
means to solve the aforementioned identity chaos. It deals with the storage, administration, and 
usage of digital identities during their lifecycle [8]. Role-based IdM in particular is seen as a means 
to get compliant in general and to easily manage identities and their access to resources ([6], [10]). 
However, the central challenge after the implementation of roles is the management and 
maintenance of the role system itself in order to assure its timeliness. This includes the operative 
administration of the user-role assignments as well as strategic tasks including, e.g., the 
administration of role-permission assignments. Several developments within an organisation might 
affect the role definitions and require the role catalogue to be adapted. With thousands of users and 
millions of authorisations in big companies this task can’t efficiently be carried out manually. 
Besides the lacking theoretical foundation, no approaches to leverage the level of automation 
during the process of role-checking have been published so far. In this work we develop a catalogue 
of use cases that affect the role catalogue within an organisation. In order to show the applicability 
and advantages of our approach we furthermore propose checkROLE, a tool for the automatic 
detection of the defined use cases. Using checkROLE organisations can automatically identify 
changes in their role definitions and keep their role catalogue up-to-date. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. After an introduction to Role System Management and periodic 
role-checks in the related work section, we introduce a catalogue of use cases as the theoretical 
foundation for automating role-checks in section 3. After a detailed description we analyse selected 
use cases showing their influence on role definitions. In section 4 we then consecutively propose 
checkROLE. Section 5 gives conclusions and points out future work.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
2.1. Role System Management 
 
Operative and strategic management of roles and the role system in general are essential tasks to 
keep the implemented role definitions usable. In order to avoid misunderstandings we define the 
terms used in the following: Role System Management is the umbrella term for operative Role 
Management and strategic Role Management (Role Maintenance). Operative Role Management 
includes routine administration duties like user-role-assignment or role-permission-assignment 
according to the given administration model. Various authors investigated this area proposing 
several role administration publications like [2], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], and [21] as well as role 
system lifecycles ([9], [11], [20]). However, operative Role Management can only be carried out 
effectively on basis of correct role definitions. Besides the maintenance of the underlying role 
concept and -model, the most important Role Maintenance duty is the up-to-date keeping of the role 
catalogue on basis of strategic Role Management processes. In contrast to its operative counterpart, 
this task heavily depends on organisational and operational structures (OOS) within a company. 
With dozens of business processes, thousands of users and millions of authorisations in big 
organisations, strategic Role Management is a seemingly difficult task. Only a few authors 
theoretically touched this issue on the brink ([11], [20]) while hardly any of them consider 
automation of Role Maintenance processes. The goal is to face Role Maintenance challenges by 
analysing existing role- and permission structures in order to provide suggestions for necessary 
changes in the role definitions, role-permission-, and user-role assignments. This way inconsistent 
permission assignments endangering compliance with security principles can be cleansed.  
 
2.2. Periodic Role-Checks 
he importance of periodic role-checks as central part of the Role Maintenance duties has recently 
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been pointed out by [9]. The goal of periodic role-checks is to evaluate the elements of a role system 
at a certain point of time in order to identify changes within a company that affect the role 
definitions. Values of role model elements of the last valid state are compared with their actual 
values in the productive systems. Periodic role-checks have to rely on existing user and access 
information as well as role definitions stored in the Identity Management Infrastructure or other 
user repositories. Together with organisational structures and the basic employee information 
coming from various directories this is a reliable and permanently available source for adequate 
user information. After the input information has been gathered the comparison of the output OP(t) 
of the productive user management environment at time t against the last valid role catalogue state 
OR(t-1) on basis of predefined use cases indicates events that affect the role definitions (see figure 
1). A consecutive impact analysis provides further assistance for resolving the discrepancies. 
Modifications in the organisational structure and user population are highlighted, for example when 
employees move to another department or a large number of new employees are hired. On basis of 
this assistance a decision for resolving the open issues has to be made manually in an analytical 
way together with business- and IT representatives. In general, one can say that this duty is an 
iterative process, reducing inconsistencies all along the overall role-check process loop. As seen in 
figure 1, periodic role-checks need to be carried out on basis of a well-defined use case catalogue. To 
the best of our knowledge no such basis has been proposed yet and no insight about underlying use 
cases as well as practical implementation issues is given in literature. In the following we close this 
gap by developing a use case catalogue that can be used as theoretical basis for role-checks.  
 
.  
Figure 1: Role-checking on basis of a given use case catalogue 
 
. Automatic Role-Checking 
3.1. Input Elements 
efore designing a comprehensive use case catalogue we identified the various elements within 
ables 1-6: Definition of input elements for role-checks 
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organisations affecting role-checks and the defined role catalogue using busiROLE [7] as 
underlying role model. BusiROLE supports the usage of various types of roles, namely Basic 
Roles, Organisational Roles, and Functional Roles and is applicable in complex role environments. 
Basic Roles bundle common access rights, Organisational Roles represent employees' positions, 
and Functional Roles correspond to the task bundles of employees. Basic Roles can be regarded as 
special Organisational Roles. Our research was carried out on basis of practical experience with 
various partners from industry on the one hand and scientific publications in the business 
administration- and role-based user management area ([3], [11], [13], and [20]) on the other hand. The 
initial analysis revealed a number of components influencing the valid set of roles (see tables 1-6): 
Employees, Organisational Hierarchies, Positions, Task Bundles, and Permission (Bundles). 
Employees e.g. could leave the company or be assigned to a different hierarchical element. A 
hierarchical element is defined as a unit in the organisational structure of an enterprise, for example 
a business unit, a department, or a unit within a department. In other cases employees might be 
promoted and assigned to a new Position and new Task Bundles. Examples for change of 
Organisational Hierarchies include mergers or major restructuring efforts within a business area. 
Additionally, Permission Bundles of users might change over time. New IT systems might be 
implemented and the respective rights assigned to the employees while old system might no longer 
be used. Various constraints, e.g. security policies restricting the user-role- and user-permission-
assignments can also affect Role Maintenance. However those constraints are usually not stored in 
a way that they could automatically be integrated into the role-checking process. Hence we focus 
on the previously introduced elements because information about those elements is likely to be 
available in an appropriate format. A definition of every element is given in the following to found 
the basis of standardised use case catalogue description in section 3.2.  
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Employees 
EMPS A set of all employees 
EMPa∈ EMPS A human being working for a certain enterprise 
 
Organisational Hierarchies 
OH A set of all Organisational Hierarchies within an enterprise with  OH = {OHtypea, OHtypeb, …, OHtypen} 
OHtypea 
One specific organisational hierarchy type within an enterprise, e.g. the 
line organisation 
OHEtypea A set of all hierarchical elements within OHtypea 
OHEa∈ OHEtypea An element of a certain organisational hierarchy type OHypea 
 
Positions 
POSITIONS The set of Positions within OH 
POSa∈ POSITIONS A Position within an OHEa ∈ OHEtypea  
 
Task Bundles 
TB Set of all Task Bundles 
TBa∈ TB A bundle of tasks serving to fulfil a certain business goal 
 
Permission Bundles 
PB Set of all Permission Bundles 
PBa∈ PB A specific Permission Bundle serving to fulfil a certain business goal 
 
Organisational and Functional Roles 
ORG_Roles Set of Organisational Roles 
FUN_Roles Set of Functional Roles 
ORG_Rolea ∈ ORG_Roles An Organisational Role defined to represent one Position 
FUN_Rolea ∈ FUN_Roles A Functional Role defined to represent one Task Bundle 
 
3.2. Use Case Catalogue Definition 
 
After the theoretical definition of input elements for role-checks we derived a comprehensive set of 
input element-specific use cases that influence the existing role definitions (see figure 2). The 
elements are classified according to their respective layer of origin: Permissions and Permission 
Bundles are representing the existing access rights and hence are directory-specific while the other 
elements are related to operational and organisational structures within a company (OOS-specific). 
For each element various operations are possible, representing one single use case. Regarding 
Organisational Hierarchies, e.g., “new”, “delete”, “split”, and “merge” are possible operations. 
Hierarchical elements can be created or deleted as a result of restructuring efforts within a 
company. The splitting and merging operations can be seen as a combination of the previously 
mentioned ones. In terms of Positions companies might e.g. define new or delete old ones. Splitting 
an existing Position into two separate units can again be modelled as definition of two new 
Positions, re-assigning the old Task Bundles appropriately, and the consecutive deletion of the old 
Position. The same holds for the “merge” or “relocate” operation. Organisations might carry out 
new Task Bundles, delete old ones, or relocate existing Task Bundles to a new Position. The “split” 
and “merge” operations can again be seen as a special combination of the basic operations. Taking 
a user-centric view one can easily recognise the various changes an Employee can go through when 
working for a company. He can either change his Position or the assigned Task Bundles, or be 
relocated to other hierarchical elements. Directory-specific use cases, finally, are dealing with 
Permission (Bundle) changes. Companies might install new resources, abandon old IT systems, or 
update existing software. The various examples regarding the “merge”, “split”, and “relocate” 
operations already have shown the interdependencies between single events. In practical settings it 
is likely that they do not occur isolated but combined. We are thus now going to identify complex 
use cases consisting of a number of the various events shown in figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical use case catalogue 
 
.3. In-Depth Analysis of Selected Use Cases 
 order to foster a clear differentiation and standardised usage we designed a three-layer scheme 
.3.1. Selected Use Case 1: Employee Changes Hierarchical Element 
tructure (figure 3):  
is assigned to a new hierarchical element OHE  and Position POSi2 in the 
pact:   
 correct execution of TBc and TBd according permissions are granted to EMPc. This means 
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describing every use case in terms of its structure, its impact on the role system, and possible 
detection mechanisms. An analysis together with user partners from industry has shown the 
applicability of this schema as a means of easing communication. We are thus using it during the 
in-depth analysis of selected use cases in the following.  
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An employee EMPc i
organisation. Due to this fact his work pattern changes and consists of new Task Bundles TBc and 
TBd. Previously he has been working in hierarchical element OHEj incorporating position POSj1 and 
related Task Bundles TBe, TBf, and TBg. 
 
Im
To enable
that he needs to be assigned to a certain number of roles corresponding to POSi2, TBc, and TBd. 
However, access right allocation is mostly done manually by IT administrators and only rarely on 
basis of automated processes that ensure that the permissions requested are granted compliant with 
current role system policies. Imagine the promotion of an employee that rapidly needs access rights 
for his new daily work and thus requests them calling several IT administrators. This usually results 
in a direct assignment of requested rights, probably on basis of the privileges of EMPb. Taking a 
closer look at necessary de-provisioning tasks unused Organisational- and Functional Roles 
corresponding to the old Position POSj1 and Task Bundles TBe, TBf, and TBg have to be revoked. 
Usually no automatic de-provisioning processes are in place so that this duty is not carried out at all 
or at most manually. Hence the employee is likely to accumulate a number of excessive rights 
within the organisations’ IT systems, violating the principle of the least privilege [6].  
 
 
Figure 3: Employee changing organisational hierarchy element 
 
etection and Actions:  
ario is to detect all employees EMPi∈ EMPS which have been assigned to 
.3.2. Selected Use Case 2: New Hierarchical Element is Created 
tructure (figure 4): 
 element OHEk is created within a company due to certain organisational 
pact:  
creation of a new hierarchical element appropriate Organisational- and Functional Roles 
D
The first step in this scen
a new hierarchical element. This can be done by analysing the according user attributes e.g. in the 
global user directory. In a second step, Role Maintenance must on the one hand examine if these 
employees have been assigned to the correct permissions and roles according to their new OHEi 
assignment. In case of any incorrect assignments this situation has to be resolved together with 
responsible executives. Role Maintenance has to check if old and thus unused access rights and role 
memberships have been correctly revoked. Statistical analysis and the integration of policies that 
e.g. define that a user is not allowed to be member of more than one Position in a certain 
organisation hierarchy type OHtypea can be facilitated to address this problem.  
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A new hierarchical
changes. It e.g. emerges from splitting an existing OHEl into two separate hierarchical elements. 
Scientific publications in the business administration area and in the area of organisational 
behaviour contain additional insight into reasons for change of hierarchical structures within an 
organisation ([3], [13]). In this scenario the creation of a hierarchical element results in the definition 
of a new position POSk1 and assignment of Task Bundles TBd, TBe ∈ TB. Employees are newly 
hired (EMPnew) or move from existing hierarchical elements to the newly created one (EMPa).  
 
Im
After the 
have to be defined. Role development has to be carried out for the new hierarchical element. 
However, in real-life settings employees quickly need permissions in order to fulfil their workload. 
Imagine the newly created department OHEk in a large company. Two employees EMPa and 
EMPnew assigned to the defined Position POSk1 need to work on a highly critical project as soon as 
possible. In such a scenario administrators would likely assign permissions manually. This situation 
is subverting the goals of the existing role system. A further disadvantage is that employees who 
later on join this specific department, will also not be provided with the correct roles but rather gain 
their permissions manually. Similar to the previous use case the employees that already worked 
within the company in a different department still might have a large number of their old 
permissions due to the lack of correct de-provisioning processes.  
 
 
Figure 4: Creation of new hierarchical element 
 
etection and Actions:  
nd react appropriately any newly created or deleted hierarchical elements 
. checkROLE – A Tool for Automated Role Checking 
s tool support for the automatic detection of the various use cases is mandatory we developed 
.1. Detecting Use Cases in CheckROLE 
igure 5 presents the main interface of checkROLE. Besides the detection scenarios (Role 
• {EMPa, EMPb, …, EMPn} have directly assigned Permission Bundles PBa ∈ PB 
D
To detect this use case a
have to be detected at first. This can be done by an analysis of available organisational charts, a list 
of valid hierarchical elements, or user attributes regarding the assignment of employees to 
hierarchical structures. Consecutively the permissions of employees working in the newly created 
hierarchical elements have to be examined. Respective Functional- and Organisational Roles must 
be implemented and the role catalogue extended accordingly if they are not in place yet. After the 
creation of the various roles within the new hierarchical elements the permissions of employees 
have to be correctly provisioned. Directly assigned permissions have to be revoked and 
membership has to be granted using roles. Unused roles might have to be deleted.  
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checkROLE an open-source application that is able to detect events affecting the role definitions. 
On this basis it provides responsible managers assistance in their decision process from figure 1. 
Input information from various user repositories at a certain point of time t is copied to the Role 
Maintenance environment using a LDAP connector or a .csv-file import. Additionally, an image of 
the currently valid role catalogue is extracted from the Role Management System. CheckROLE 
provides interfaces to an Active Directory storing the role catalogue, synchronised identity 
information, as well as access rights. Moreover a connector to other external Role Mining tools 
gives us the ability to execute non-statistical analysis of user data.  
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Maintenance) the Import to LDAP tab provides the ability to set up the data basis contained in the 
underlying repository. To support additional Role Mining tasks, an Export to DB tab was 
implemented providing export functionality of user and permission data. For real-life applicability 
we narrowed down the theoretically defined use cases according to their outcome to nine so called 
detection scenarios that checkROLE is able to identify. These detection scenarios occur in various 
combinations, dependent on the underlying use cases from section 3: 
 
• {EMPa, EMPb, …, EMPn} have a set of wrong or unused Organisational Roles  
{ORa, ORb, …, ORn} ∈ ORG_Roles 
• inconsistent assignment of Permission Bundle PBa ∈ PB to FUN_Rolea ∈ FUN_Roles 
• inconsistent assignment of Functional Role FUN_Rolea ∈ FUN_Roles to Organisational 
Role ORG_Rolea ∈ ORG_Roles  
• detection of new Permission Bundle PBnew ∈ PB 
• detection of changes in Position definitions 
• detection of changes in Organisational Hierarchies 
 
 
Figure 5: CheckROLE interface 
4.2. Test Scenario 
 
In order to demonstrate the application of checkROLE, we are going to present a short test scenario 
in a small industrial company with about 10 departments, 45 employees and 15 different business 
roles granting membership to about 50 different Active Directory groups (permissions). The 
company has implemented busiROLE as role model. For the role-checks user information and the 
existing role catalogue have been imported to the Role Maintenance environment using a LDAP 
connection to the global Active Directory within the company. Applying the Check user moves and 
the Check users OR functionality of checkROLE generates the output windows shown in figure 6.  
 
      
Figure 6: CheckROLE test scenario output 
 
The window on the left lists the employees that have changed their hierarchical element(s) and/or 
Position since the last role-checking loop. Positions of employees are stored in the title attribute 
within the Active Directory of the company. One can see that three users previously working in the 
Development department have joined the MigrationTeam. Their title attribute has changed, e.g. 
from Developer to ProjectLeader in case of employee PetBrau. Security policies prevent users to 
have more than one Position and Organisational Role at a certain point of time. CheckROLE 
identified that PetBrau is still connected to his old Organisational Role (OR_Developer) and that 
his title attribute has a different entry not corresponding to the Organisational Role assigned. 
Investigating the valid roles in the department MigrationTeam OR_ProjectLeader is suggested as 
the correct role. This needs to be done on basis of cluster analysis of existing rights within the 
respective department, closely interwoven with Role Development issues. The output window on 
the right side of figure 6 reveals directly assigned permissions. Even though all the permissions 
imported to the Role Maintenance environment have to be granted on basis of role membership, 
checkROLE identified several direct user-permission assignments. Employee PetBrau is e.g. on the 
one hand still able to access the various resources connected to his old Organisational Role. To 
fulfil the tasks related to his new Position ProjectLeader he was on the other hand assigned to the 
necessary permissions SW-Remedy-G, Project_Schedule, SW-RaD_Tools-G, and NET_Framework 
directly. With this output responsible role managers now are able to take adequate measures to 
resolve the found issues. This short scenario has shown that checkROLE is able to support strategic 
Role Management and provide information that might not even have been identified at all.  
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this paper we have seen that companies require support in ensuring the timeliness of the 
implemented roles in their IT infrastructure. Several changes within an organisation might affect 
the role definitions and require the role catalogue to be updated. This requires an automated 
overview over possible changes to be integrated in a Role Maintenance solution. Up to now, to the 
best of our knowledge, no assistance is provided by researchers in this area. Consequently we 
defined a use case catalogue that acts as theoretical basis for role-checks. An in-depth analysis of 
single use cases has revealed their structure, impact on the role definitions, and possible detection 
mechanisms. We furthermore presented checkROLE a tool for automatic detection of various use 
cases. It facilitates statistical analysis and data mining algorithms to compare a valid role catalogue 
with the present situation within a company in order to identify discrepancies. A short test scenario 
has shown the applicability of checkROLE within a small company. For future work we are going 
to add new functionalities for detecting combined use cases and migrate towards a process-oriented 
role checking workflow. Up to now checkROLE only provides a simple text-based presentation of 
results. For a seamless integration into future Role Maintenance and Role Development solutions it 
needs to be extended in order to allow for an automatic correction of detected anomalies. Moreover 
the text-based visualisation is very limited in terms of readability in more complex test scenarios. 
We hence are implementing an adequate solution that presents the found results in a more 
structured way allowing for interaction with the checkROLE users, i.e. the Role Maintenance team. 
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